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The Limits of Constitutional Convergence
Rosalind Dixon* & Eric A. Posner**

Abstract
Globali.Zation, some legal scholars suggest, is a force that makes increasing converence
among dfferent countries' constitutions more or less inevitable. This Essay explores this
hypothesis by anaying both the logic-andpotential limits-tofour diferent mechanisms of
constitutional converence: first, changes in global "superstructure"; second, comparative
learning, third, internationalcoercion; andfourth, global competition. For each mechanism, it
shows, quite special conditions will in fact be requiredbefore global convergence is likely even at
the level of legal polig. At a constitutional level, it further suggests, it will be even rarerfor
these mechanisms to create wholesale convergence. This also has direct implicationsfor ongoing
debates over the desirability of constitutional decision-makers seeking to engage in global
learning or borrowing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, legal scholars have given increasing attention to the ways in
which constitutional law in one country influences the development of
constitutional law in another country.! This scholarship has been driven in part
by the high-profile, politically charged debate about whether the US Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions should rely on foreign law. But the scholarship
also addresses larger questions about the process of legal change and the
relationship between national law and globalization.
There are two positions in this debate. The first is that the constitutional
law of one country is, or should be, largely independent of the constitutional law
of other countries. 3 The people or national political elites choose a constitutional
law that meets their needs. This claim is sometimes made today about the US
Constitution. The US Constitution changes through amendment or judicial
construction that, with a few exceptions, is not influenced by constitutional
developments elsewhere in the world. To be sure, all constitutions must start
somewhere. The drafters of the US Constitution were influenced by British and
Roman constitutional law, English common law, and constitutional theory from
continental Europe. But in mature constitutional systems, foreign influence is
muted.'
The second is that the constitutional law of one state inevitably influences,
and should influence, constitutional law in other states, putting aside extreme
cases-such as isolated countries like North Korea or failed states like Somalia.
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I

See, for example, Lori Fisler Damrosch and Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: The United States
Constitudon and InternationalLaw, 98 Am J Intl L 42 (2004); Comment, The Debate Over Foreign Law
in Roper v. Simmons, 119 Harv L Rev 103 (2005).

2

See, for example, Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 573, 576-77 (2003) (Kennedy); Roper v Simmons,
543 US 551, 576-77 (2005) (Kennedy). For opposition to this use of foreign and international
law, see, for example, H Res 568, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (Mar 17, 2004); Constitution Restoration
Act of 2004, S 2082, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 12, 2004).

3

See Roger P. Alford, Misusing InternationalSources to Interet the Constitution, 98 Am J Intl L 57, 66
(2004); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the US before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong, 3d Sess (2005) (statement of
Judge John Roberts in response to a question from Senator Jon Kyl); Richard A. Posner, Foreword:
A Political Court, 119 Harv L Rev 31, 84-90 (2005); Antonin Scalia, CommentaU, 40 SLU L J 1119
(1996).

4

See Scalia, 40 SLU L J at 21 (cited in note 3) (making normative arguments to this effect).
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Constitutional systems are not hermetically sealed.' Judges and other relevant
decision-makers seek inspiration in the constitutional developments of foreign
countries, or, at least, cannot help but be influenced by what happens elsewhere.
Scholars who take this position tend to believe that constitutions not only
influence each other but also become more similar, so that over time
constitutions converge.'
Supporters of the convergence thesis can cite a mass of anecdotal evidence.
Liberal democracy has advanced in a succession of waves over the past two
hundred years. Setbacks have occurred, but the trend is clear and in the last
several decades has accelerated. Judicial independence, including judicial
protection of individual rights, has also advanced steadily, making significant
incursions in countries with traditions of parliamentary sovereignty.' At the retail
level, certain kinds of rights-freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the
right not to be tortured-have spread, as have various doctrinal techniques for
trading off liberties and other values.' Citing this evidence, Mark Tushnet has
argued for the "inevitability" of at least some forms of constitutional
convergence."
But the convergence thesis raises a number of questions that have received
little attention from scholars. The major empirical question is whether
convergence is really taking place-whether the anecdotal evidence reflects deep
forces or is epiphenomenal. Recent years have seen an upsurge of
authoritarianism in Russia, China, and many other countries, and certain types of
convergence at the retail level have been offset by other types of new or

5

See, for example, Sujit Choudhry, GlobaliZation in Search ofJustifiration:Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 Ind L J 819 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Comment, Constitutional
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 Harv L Rev 109 (2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
A Global Community of Courts, 44 Harv Intl L J 191 (2003); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 Yale LJ 1225 (1999).

6

See, for example, David S. Law, Globaliaionand the Future of ConstitutionalRights, 102 Nw U L Rev
1277 (2008); Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable GlobaliZation of Constitutional Law, 49 Va J Intl L 985
(2009). For other endorsements of the convergence thesis, see Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar
Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in Sujit Choudhry, ed, The Migration of ConstitutionalIdeas 84
(Cambridge 2007); T.R.S. Allan, ConstitutionalJustice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford
2001); David M. Beatty, The Ulimate Rule ofLaw (Oxford 2004).

7

See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 1992). But see
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of CiviliZations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & Schuster
1996).
See, for example, Linda Camp Keith, Judidal Independence and Human Rights Protection Around the
World, 85 Judicature 195, 197-200 (2002).

8
9

10

Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Oigins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard
2004).
Tushnet, 49 Va J Intl L at 992-93 (cited in note 6).
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persistent divergence. Recent empirical studies, such as those by Tom Ginsburg,
Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, and by David Law and Mira Versteeg, have
found no systematic pattern of constitutional convergence."
There is also the theoretical question of why one would expect
convergence to take place. What are the mechanisms of constitutional
borrowing and convergence? One such theory is David Law's.12 He argues that
states adopt similar constitutional norms in order to attract capital investment
and migration. For example, because investors can easily move their money to
countries that offer the highest return, because certain constitutional normspreeminently, protection of property rights by an independent judiciary-are
necessary to ensure high returns, and because countries seek foreign investment,
countries will compete for investors by constitutionalizing property rights.
However, Law identifies just one of a number of possible mechanisms of
constitutional convergence, and his theory, as we will show, is vulnerable to
important objections.
In this Essay, we describe four paths to constitutional convergence,
address the evidence for each of them, and discuss their normative significance.
Superstructure theories argue that constitutions reflect deeper forces-technological,
demographic, economic-and so constitutions converge across countries just
when those other factors converge. If, for example, increased international trade
reduces within-country inequality, and constitutional norms reflect the degree of
inequality, then constitutional convergence should occur when international
trade increases-which it has over the last fifty years. If these theories are
correct, then constitutional borrowing is not within the direct control of legal
and political decision-makers. Constitutional change is epiphenomenal.
The other three mechanisms assume that decision-makers do control
constitutional change, and are not merely puppets of hidden forces.' 3 Learning

l1

12
13

See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and Beth Simmons, How do InternationalHuman Rights Treaties
Influence Naional Constituions? (Working Paper, 2010) (on file with authors) (finding a mixed
pattern in respect to the incorporation of international human rights guarantees into the text of
national constitutions); David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, The Evoludon and Ideologv of Global
Constituionalism, 99 Cal L Rev *6, 37, 73-80 (2011) (forthcoming) online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1643628 (visited Nov 6, 2010) (finding in
the text of post-World War II constitutions a pattern of increasing convergence toward a
"generic" global rights core, but also increasing polarization, or divergence, in respect of the
degree to which constitutions are 'statist' versus 'libertarian' or "presuppose and enshrine a farreaching role for the state in a variety of domains").
Law, 102 Nw U L Rev at 1296-97 (cited in note 6).
We draw on the large literature on policy diffusion in political science. This literature originally
addresses the diffusion of policy among the American states, but in recent years the ideas in that
literature have been applied to the diffusion of policy among nation states. See, for example, Beth
A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins, The GlobaliZaion of Liberakgation:Poliy Diffusion in the International
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theories argue that judges, political actors, and other people who influence
constitutional norms self-consciously copy what they see in other countries.
These theories imply that constitutional borrowing will often go in one
direction-from more successful or older countries to less successful or newer
countries, or from countries with a great deal of experience with an issue to
countries that must address that issue for the first time. Learning theories
underlie the positions of those who urge the US Supreme Court to borrow from
foreign law.' 4
Coercion theories argue that countries try to compel other countries to change
their constitutional norms. We define "coercion" broadly to include threats (to
cut off trade, to withhold aid, to use military force, etc), bribes, peer pressure,
and more intangible risks to reputation. Indeed, the "target" states may
voluntarily change their norms in order to avoid being cut off or isolated, or to
preserve or enhance their reputation for international cooperativeness. This
phenomenon can lead to herd behavior and other pathologies of collective
action.
Competition theories argue that countries change their norms to attract capital,
migration, or trade. Law's is one such competition theory, but, as we will discuss,
there are others as well. It turns out that competition leads to convergence only
under special conditions; competition can also lead to divergence, as illustrated
by Tiebout's model of jurisdictional competition.
After describing these theories, we analyze the conditions necessary for
each theory to lead to constitutional convergence. We identify several factors
that may limit the degree to which each mechanism creates convergence.
Superstructure theories imply that convergence will not take place when
underlying factors such as equality diverge across states. Learning theories imply
that convergence will not take place when there exists disagreement among
countries about constitutional values, rather than means for implementing
constitutional values about which there already exists a consensus. Coercion
theories imply that convergence will not take place unless a single country (or a
group of constitutionally similar countries) dominates international affairs, and

14

'5

Political Economy, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev 171 (2004) (analyzing the diffusion of liberal economic
policies); Kurt Weyland, Theories of Podiy Diffusion: Lessons frm Latin American Pension Reform, 57
World Pol 262 (2005) (analyzing the diffusion of pension reform). For previous work applying
this in a constitutional context, see, for example, Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh, and Zachary
Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law,
2008 U Ill L Rev 201 (2008).
For arguments in favor of this kind of empirical or functionally-oriented forms of comparison,
see, for example, Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Intepreting the U.S. Constitution: Some
Reflections, 39 Tex Intl L J 353, 364 (2004); Tushnet, 108 Yale L J 1225 (cited in note 5).
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theof of LocalExpenditures,64J of Pol Econ 416 (1956).
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has both a strong enough interest in, and set of tools for, enforcing its preferred
constitutional principles. Competition theories imply that convergence will not
take place when people in different countries have sufficiently different
preferences with regard to constitutional outcomes or public goods more
generally.
In a brief conclusion, we address implications for the practice of
constitutional comparison by courts and other decision-makers, and academics.
II. CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS
Scholars writing about constitutional convergence use the term in a general
way that masks a number of complexities. We address some of these
complexities here.
Rights versus Structure. In making claims about constitutional convergence,
some scholars, such as David Law, focus on the idea of rights-based
convergence or a global "race to the top" when it comes to the protection of
individual rights generally or certain rights such as the right to freedom of
Others, such as Mark Tushnet, have focused on structural
expression.
constitutional norms, such as those governing legislative and judicial supremacy
or finality.'7 Clearly it is important to distinguish between the two claims:
structural convergence occurs when the form of government-separation of
powers, for example-converges; convergence of rights occurs when states
adopt similar constitutional rights. The two forms of convergence may occur in
parallel; be mutually reinforcing; or rather work in opposite directions, so that
convergence in one domain serves to entrench constitutional difference, or even
promote greater constitutional divergence, in the other.
Retail versus Wholesale Constitutional Norms. In assessing claims about
constitutional convergence, it is also important to distinguish between
"wholesale" and "retail" forms of constitutional convergence. Wholesale
convergence involves the development of across-the-board similarities between
different constitutional systems; retail forms of convergence can co-exist with
substantial constitutional differences in other areas. One could imagine, for
example, a general trend in favor of limited government, but divergent
approaches to limited government, with some states opting for presidential
systems with separation of powers and others opting for parliamentary systems
with strong norms of party cooperation.
In some cases, retail-level forms of convergence may also contribute to
increasing divergence at the wholesale level. Take the changes made to
16

See Law, 102 Nw U L Rev 1277 (cited in note 6).

1

See Tushnet, 49 Va J Intl L 985 (cited in note 6).
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Venezuela's Constitution in 1998-99, allowing for constitutional amendments to
be proposed by a constituent assembly, rather than by the ordinary legislature.'
In 1992, Donald Lutz compiled "an index of difficulty" for the difficulty of
amending various national constitutions, worldwide, based on the formal legal
hurdles to the proposal and adoption of amendments in particular countries. 9
The mean score on this index was 3.26. On this measure, the amendment rule in
Venezuela was substantially above the mean: Lutz gave Venezuela an index
score of 4.75.20 Only the US and (what was then) Yugoslavia had constitutions
that were more difficult to amend. 21 The move in Venezuela in 1998-99 to make
amendment to the constitution less difficult was, therefore, clearly an instance of
retail-level constitutional convergence. At the same time, this change also paved
the way for subsequent changes to the Venezuelan Constitution, such as the
creation of five branches of government and a unicameral legislature, which
made the Constitution substantially less, rather than more, similar at a wholesale
level to other constitutions worldwide.22
Convergence versus Liberai.ation.Countries have added formal, written rights
guarantees to their constitutions with great frequency over the last several
decades, and they very rarely remove rights from their constitutions.23 States
have thus "liberalized" in the sense of adding these rights, but liberalization is
not the same thing as convergence.
Convergence occurs when the rights states add become more similar. Law
and Versteeg, however, have found that liberalization in post-World War II
constitutions has not in fact produced convergence in written constitutions, but
instead a bimodal distribution of constitutions.24 States have diverged from a
common core of rights to two separate models.
Another good illustration of this distinction involves recent trends in global
laws on abortion. In this context, there has been a quite clear trend toward
liberalization in recent years: thirteen countries moved to allow greater access to
abortion, while only three (El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Poland) moved to
18

See Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Asamblea Nacional Constituyente,
online at http://www.analitica.com/bitblioteca/venezuela/constitucion-ingles.pdf (English) and
http://www.gobiernoenlinea.ve/docMgr/sharedfiles/059.pdf (Spanish) (visited Oct 20, 2010).
See also Larry Rohter, 80% of Vote Reported to Back Rewrite of Venequela's Charter, NY Times A9
(Apr 26, 1999).

19

Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theoy of ConstitutionalAmendment, in Sanford Levinson, ed, Responding to
Imperfection: The Theoy and Practiceof ConstitutionalAmendment237, 261 (Princeton 1995).

20

Id.

21

Id at 260-61.

22

See Larry Rohter, Venequelans Give ChaveZAllthe Powers He Wanted, NY Times All (Dec 16, 1999).

23

See Law and Versteeg, 99 Cal L Rev at *31-35 (cited in note 11).

24

Id at *39-67.
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restrict access to abortion.25 This has not, however, involved anything like clear
convergence toward a single global position on abortion because prior to this,
countries were equally divided between wholly prohibiting access to abortion (or
at least strictly limiting access to it to circumstances where it was necessary to
save the life of a woman) and allowing it on extremely broad grounds.26
Constitutionalversus Poli Convergence. Constitutional convergence should not
be confused with policy convergence or what political scientists call "policy
diffusion." 27 In the context of abortion regulation, for example, while abortion
rights have clearly spread across the globe in recent years,2 8 this may or may not
represent constitutional convergence depending on how one draws the line
between constitutional and more ordinary statutory or policy norms.29
25

26

27

World Abortion Laws 2009 Factsbeet, (Center for Reproductive Rights 2009), online at
(visited Oct
http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/world-abortion-laws-2009-fact-sheet
20, 2010); Susheela Singh, et al, Aborion Worldwide: A Decade of Uneven Progress 12 (Guttmacher
Institute 2009), online at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/AWWfullreport.pdf (visited Oct 20,
2010).
Anika Rahman, Laura Katzive, and Stanley K. Henshaw, A Global Review of Laws on Induced
Abortion, 1985-1997, 24 Intl Fain Planning Perspectives 56, 58 (1998) (noting that as of 1997,
among 151 countries worldwide, 54 countries wholly prohibited abortion or permitted access only
where necessary to save the life of the mother; another 54 recognized rights of access to abortion
on socio-economic grounds or without restriction as to reason; and 43 countries took a more
intermediate position, which permitted access to abortion where a woman's physical or mental
health was threatened).
But see Simmons and Elkins, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev 171 (cited in note 13).

28

Singh, et al, Abortion Worldwide at 12, online at www.guttmacher.org/pubs/AWWfullreport.pdf
(cited in note 25).

29

For example, in most of the 100 or so countries that the Guttmacher Institute identified as
providing broad or relatively broad access to abortion, abortion rights were purely statutory or
code-based in origin. See Abortion Policies: A Global Review (United Nations 2002), online at
(visited Oct 21, 2010) (detailing
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/
abortion rights in Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Ghana, Greece, Guinea, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic
of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe). In a significant number of other cases, access to abortion was also the pure product
of the common law defense of necessity (see, for example, the position of Australia, Gambia,
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Northern Ireland), and executive or royal degree (see, for
example, the position in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Slovak Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). Id. There were also few countries, among these three
groups, where the relevant legal or policy limits on abortion could be said to reflect a
constitutional "ceiling" created by any textual guarantee of fetal life. Id. (Examples of countries in
this category are Ecuador and Poland, and, at least prior to 2010, Spain). This does not mean,
however, that if one took a more functional approach to the question of entrenchment, or limits

406

VoL 11 No. 2

Dixon &'vPosner

The Limits of ConstitutionalConvergence

One obvious way to draw such a line is by reference to the scope of
written constitutions.30 The problem with this approach, however, is that
constitutional rules can also be created by judicial construction, requiring the
researcher to consult cases as well as written rules, and judicial opinions are
often difficult to interpret. In addition, some countries, like the UK, have
unwritten constitutions-constitutional norms can exist as a part of the political
understanding without being written down, let alone in any single canonical text
labeled "constitutional."
Thus, a second way to identify constitutional convergence is by reference
to the idea of entrenchment-in other words, the idea that, either as a matter of
legal form or political convention, changes to some legal rules require a degree
of super-majority, as opposed to ordinary-majority, support in the legislature.
On this view, in countries such as the UK, Parliament changes the constitution
by enacting statutes; even in the US, Congress may create constitutional or
quasi-constitutional norms by enacting certain kinds of "super-statutes.""
For some authors, even this definition is too narrow to capture people's
actual understanding of what counts as constitutional in various countries.
Therefore, a third way to approach the issue is by reference to those laws that
help establish, or alternatively "check" or impose limits on, the scope of
government power, or even simply to ask what laws people within a particular
society view as fundamental.32
Each of the three approaches has somewhat different advantages in terms
of the tradeoff it makes between objectivity and over- versus underinclusiveness. Each also suggests a somewhat different understanding of how
constitutional change occurs: on the first view, constitutional change will occur
only via formal constitutional amendment or replacement; on the second view, it
may occur via the enactment or handing down of either super-statutes or
"super-precedents" 33 ; and only on the third view, via any and all of these

on government power, that abortion rights in all of these countries would necessarily enjoy purely
sub-constitutional, rather than constitutional, status.
30

31

32

33

This, for example, is the approach generally adopted in various large-n studies of global
constitutions, though the authors also clearly acknowledge the limits of such an approach. See, for
example, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, The Endurance of NationalConstiutions
(Cambridge 2009).
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L J 1215 (2001). See also
Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations(Belknap 1993).
See discussion in Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, Introduction, in Rosalind Dixon and Tom
Ginsburg, eds, The Research Handbook in ComparativeConstitutionalLaw (Edward Elgar, forthcoming
2011).
Michael

J. Gerhardt, The Power ofPrecedent177-85,

Winter 2011
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mechanisms, or by more ordinary forms of statutory, common law, and popular
constitutional change.34
No matter which of these approaches one prefers, however, some
distinction of this kind must clearly be drawn if claims about constitutional
convergence are to be assessed with any accuracy.
Borrowing versus Convergence. The literature also often neglects the distinction
between constitutional borrowing and constitutional convergence, in many cases
treating borrowing as tantamount to convergence. Borrowing, however, need
not result in convergence. Imagine that only one of the 200-odd countries
constitutionalizes, for example, a right to gay marriage. Now a second country
imitates the first. The second country has in this way engaged in constitutional
borrowing, but clearly constitutional convergence is not taking place. Indeed,
divergence is taking place. A nearly unanimous refusal to constitutionalize a right
to gay marriage has eroded. Convergence can take place only against a
background in which a majority of states recognize a constitutional rule, and
then members of the minority borrow from the majority. Much of what today
appears to be constitutional convergence-for example, adoption of judicially
enforceable bills of rights-started off as divergence by first-movers from the
opposite norm.
III. CONVERGENCE MECHANISMS AND THEIR LIMITS
This Part surveys the four mechanisms of constitutional convergence.
Throughout, we focus on the mechanisms through which convergence occurs
(or does not occur), and provide some preliminary evidence by way of
illustration.
A. Superstructure Theories
A number of scholars writing in the economics and political science
literatures treat constitutions as endogenous-that is, as the outcomes of deeper
social processes that are outside the control of constitution-makers. As an
illustration, we use the argument of Acemoglu and Robinson.3 5
Their model divides society into elites and ordinary people. The elites enjoy
disproportionate wealth, education, and other favorable attributes. At an early
stage, the elites have all the power under the constitution. They enact laws that

3

3

On popular constitutionalism, see, for example, Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular
ConstitudonaksmandJudicialRetiew (Oxford 2004).
The following is based on Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic O :*ns of
Dictatorship and Democray (Cambridge 2006). See also Carles Boix, Democrag and Redistribution
(Cambridge 2003).
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create public goods (for example, defense against external enemies), but impose
all the costs on ordinary citizens through taxes. At this earlier stage, defacto and
dejure power are aligned: the people do not have (dejure) political rights (such as
the right to vote) that could be used to affect policy, nor do they have enough
(de facto) power or organizational capacity to launch peaceful protests such as
strikes or violent protests, so as to compel the elites to make concessions to the
people's interests.
Over time, technological, demographic, and other changes transfer some de
facto power to the people. They become better educated, allowing them to
organize more effectively, or to be able to deprive the elites of more wealth by
going on strike. They become more numerous and hence more difficult for the
elites to control. They take advantage of new communication technologies that
allow them to mobilize. At some point, the defacto power of the people exceeds
their dejure power by a substantial amount. A salient event-an economic crisis,
a military defeat-provides a focal point that allows the people to organize
protests against the elite-controlled regime. The people demand that the elites
transfer wealth to them, and threaten to use strikes and violence against elites
and their property if their demands are not met.
The elites could respond in several ways. First, they could engage in
repression. If repression is successful, then the elites do not have to transfer
wealth to the people. But repression is costly and, more importantly, if it fails, a
violent revolution could occur, with the result that the elites are deprived of all
or most of their property. Second, the elites could make one-time transfers of
wealth to the people. For example, they could reduce taxes, or build clinics and
schools. The problem here-and the reason that the transfer of wealth is onetime-is that the elites cannot credibly promise to make the transfer permanent,
for example, in the form of permanently more progressive taxation. Once the
crisis passes and the people's ability to organize falters, the elites will rationally
stop transferring wealth to the people. Third, the elites could make permanent
constitutional concessions to the people. For example, they could extend the
franchise to the people. Here, the people are given de jure powers that match
their de facto power. Technically, because a broad franchise favors the median
voter and the people (by definition) form the majority, the extension of the
franchise will transfer power from the elites to the people. Institutional changes
solve the commitment problem, satisfying the people and persuading them to
desist from violent revolution.
Which path do the elites choose? Acemoglu and Robinson focus on the
distribution of wealth. If the elites start off much wealthier than the people
(inequality is high), then the people have a strong incentive to threaten
revolution. However, the elites fear that if they grant democratic concessions to
the people, then the people, once in power, will implement massive tax-and-

Winter 2011

409

Chicagojournalof InternationalLaw

transfers. So the elites will respond with repression if inequality is high, and nondemocracy will prevail.
If inequality is low, then the elites do not fear massive tax-and-transfers
after the people obtain the franchise. The wealth of the median voter is not
much different from the wealth of the elites; accordingly, the median voter will
not support a radically progressive tax-and-transfer system. But by the same
token, the people are less likely to demand constitutional concessions in the first
place. Already happy with their lot, they have little incentive to incur the costs of
revolution to obtain constitutional rights that would not improve their wellbeing. If inequality is low, non-democracy will also prevail.
Democracy will come into existence only in the intermediate case, where
inequality is neither high nor low. Inequality is high enough to spur the people
toward revolution. The costs of revolution are less than the gains to be had from
political power that would allow the people to redistribute wealth. But inequality
is low enough to discourage the elites from engaging in repression. If inequality
is not too high, then the people, once in power, will not need to redistribute
wealth very much.
The constitution, then, reflects fundamental demographic factors such as
inequality.36 Inequality itself will also be a function of technology, population
density, and so forth. These factors also influence the constitution by affecting
the ability of the people to launch a revolution and the elites to launch a coup; as
we have seen, technological changes that make it easier for the people to
organize will result in a more democratic constitution. 7
36

Acemoglu and Robinson also discuss two other variables: the size of the middle class and the
economic structure of the country. A larger middle class encourages democratization because the
median voter is likely to be closer in wealth to the elites. An economy dependent on land
ownership is less likely to democratize than an industrial or commercial economy because the
government can tax landowners (who lack an exit option) more easily than it can tax capital and
income from capital (which can be more easily moved abroad). Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic
Ongins at 283-86 (cited in note 35).
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One question that arises is why the two sides will obey the dejure constitution at all. Why don't
they just act on the basis of defacto power? Acemoglu and Robinson assume that the parties will
act on the basis of de facto power only when the de jure distribution of power and de facto
distribution of power diverge by more than some threshold. Id at 23. The reason is that either
side will organize and use force if the other side engages in a dejure violation. But see Barry R.
Weingast, SelfEnforcing Constitutions: With an Applicaion to Democratic Stability in America's Firrt
online
at
Paper
Nov
2008),
Century
(Working
http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/weingast/WeingastSelf-EnforcingConstitutio900.pdf
(visited Oct 20, 2010). We might, then, distinguish "normal times," when both sides comply with
the de jure rules, and "crises," when one side threatens violence unless those de jure rules are
changed. In normal times, parties comply with dejure rules because they fear that violation will
lead to a violent response by the other side. In crisis times, one side violates or threatens to violate
the dejure rule in an effort to establish a new constitutional rule; it can do so because the other
side's threat to retaliate is no longer credible (because it has lost defacto power). A crisis occurs
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Our purpose is not to criticize or defend this theory, but to use it as an
illustration of the possibility that constitutions are purely endogenous. This
means that constitutional convergence will take place only if the underlying
factors that determine constitutional design themselves converge. In Acemoglu
and Robinson's model, convergence to liberal democracy will take place only if
countries converge to an intermediate level of inequality. This, in turn, depends
on other factors-for example, the diffusion of technology that favors a
particular level of inequality.
Thus, the question of constitutional convergence becomes a more general
question about the extent to which technology and perhaps other factors such as
social norms spread across states. Globalization is often taken to refer to such
homogenization, and indeed the constitutional convergence debate could be
understood as an offshoot of the globalization debate. However, although
globalization has involved the diffusion of technology, it has not led to
convergence in the degree of inequality in each state. In some states inequality
has increased, while in other states inequality has declined."
B. Learning
States learn from each other. During the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese
government sent officials around the world to learn about the policies and
institutions of other countries, and imitated those judged to be best. 9 In the
early twentieth century, first fascist, then communist political institutions gained
adherents because they appeared to successfully address economic malaise and
class warfare. In the late twentieth century, liberal economic practices spread
around the world as communist governments collapsed and their successors
sought models in the wealthiest states.40 These same countries also sought new
constitutional arrangements and many of them imitated western constitutions. 41
In all cases, the imitation seemed to result from a self-conscious effort by
government officials and ordinary citizens to evaluate the practices in foreign
states and adopt those that seemed best.

38

when a salient event such as an economic downturn or war provides a focus for the people's
grievances, enabling them to organize when otherwise organization would be thwarted by the
collective action problem.
Raymond Torres, ed, World of Work Report 2008: Income Inequalities in the Age of Financial
at
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http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/world08.pdf (visited Oct 21, 2010).
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See Marius B. Jansen, The Making ofModern Japan 355-64 (Belknap 2000).
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For evidence, see Simmons and Elkins, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev at 182 (cited in note 13).
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It might seem obvious that states would study the policies of other states

and imitate those that work best, but there are two major limits to the value of
learning. First, all states are different, and what works in one state will not
necessarily work in another state. As Kurt Weyland notes in his study of the
diffusion of pension reform in Latin America, the liberalized pension system
initiated by Chile may not be appropriate for states with different demographic
burdens and economic conditions.42 Second, states may define "success"
differently. In empirical studies, "success" is usually defined in terms of
economic performance,43 but most governments have other concerns as well,
such as maintaining political stability, respecting public values, and staying in
power, which may mean paying off disparate groups with narrow ends.
To examine these factors more rigorously, and in the constitutional setting,
imagine that one state has a constitutional norm that establishes a particular
religion, while another state has a constitutional norm that forbids religious
establishment. Should the first state imitate the second state (or vice versa)?
Several considerations may come into play. Initially, what does the first state
hope to achieve through its constitutional religion clause? It seems unlikely that
it seeks economic growth. More likely, it hopes to keep religious peace, or (what

may be the same thing) to satisfy the preferences of powerful interest groups, or
(conceivably) to address religious objectives. If the second state does not share
these objectives, then its example will be of little value to the first state. So if the
first state is a theocracy like Iran, and the second state is a secular democracy like
the US, one would not predict that Iran would imitate the US.
Suppose, however, that the states share the same goal. For example, both
states have a history of internal religious turmoil, and hope to keep religious
peace through a constitutional norm. They just disagree about how to do it.
Policymakers in the first state believe that an established church channels
religious enthusiasm into placid bureaucratic channels while delegitimizing
radical sects." Policymakers in the second state believe that a government
position of neutrality ensures that competition among religious groups will
remain peaceful. 45 These propositions are both empirical assumptions, albeit
extremely difficult to evaluate and test. It is therefore not surprising that once a
particular state picks one approach, it will not change it unless the evidence of
the superiority of the alternative approach becomes overwhelming.
42

Weyland, 57 World Pol at 279-81 (cited in note 13).
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See, for example, Simmons and Elkins, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev at 182 (cited in note 13).
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Accordingly, if the first state experiences some religious turmoil, while the
second does not, the first state will not necessarily conclude that the approach of
the second state is superior. It will engage in Bayesian updating, taking into
account its priors as well as the experiences of the other state and the fact that
differences in conditions in that other state, not constitutional differences, may
account for its relative success. A further relevant factor is the extent to which
other states act like the second state and also experience religious peace. As the
number of other such states increases, the probability that the constitutional
provision generates religious peace increases rapidly."6
The last point we need to address is the difference between policy and
constitutional convergence. States that observe successful policies in other states
are most likely to want to experiment with those policies before entrenching
them. Otherwise, they may find that foreign practices do not translate well
domestically, but are nonetheless difficult to reverse. In many cases,
constitutional learning will also point to the dangers of particular constitutional
choices, in which case, domestic decision-makers are even less likely to want to
entrench legal changes domestically. A good example of this is the response of
countries such as India and Canada to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Due Process Clause during the Lochner era: this experience was a major reason,
many people have suggested, for excluding a general guarantee of liberty from
entrenched constitutional protections in these countries."7
Thus, borrowing will most commonly take the form of statutory and
regulatory borrowing, not constitutional borrowing. There is a paradox here for
constitutional convergence because, to the extent that constitutionalism involves
entrenchment, it is hard to see how one can experiment with entrenchment.
This may explain why the most prominent examples of constitutional borrowing
occur when states experience crises (for example, eastern European states after
the fall of communism) and when the decisions of constitutional courts are
relatively easy to reverse, at least as a formal matter (most of the world outside
the US).
In sum, a state will rationally update its priors and change a constitutional
norm when other states with similar demographic and social conditions have a
different constitutional norm that produces a better outcome, and those other
states are sufficiently numerous. These are the strong conditions for borrowing,
and-to the extent these conditions apply to most or all states-convergence.
The main constraint on convergence through learning, then, is the inherent
46

See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan L Rev 131 (2006).
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diversity of states, both in their social conditions and the goals of their
populations.
C. Coercion, Reputation, and Bribing
States might also adopt the constitutional norms of other states in response
to various kinds of international pressure. Pressure of this kind can take a
number of forms. At one extreme, powerful states may attempt to force weak
states to change their constitutions by threatening them with military force,
blockades, economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and other harms. At the
other extreme, powerful states may attempt to encourage weak states to change
their constitutions simply by offering certain economic incentives, such as cash,
foreign aid, or trade concessions, or by social and diplomatic pressures. In
between, there are various more subtle forms of pressure. States may be subject
to certain distinct forms of peer pressure.4 8 Weak states in particular may also
want to maintain a reputation for cooperativeness among powerful states, and
for this reason try to anticipate the wishes of powerful states by imitating their
constitutional forms, even without being asked to do so.49
Consider the influence of the EU and US after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The EU, during this period, attempted to exert significant pressure on
various former Soviet countries to adopt European constitutional norms,
including human rights norms such as the ban on the death penalty, by holding
out the possibility of accession to states in the European periphery.so The US, in
turn, tried to export the so-called "Washington Consensus," which emphasized
monetary stability, free markets, and political liberalization, by urging the
International Monetary Fund to condition loans to emerging countries on
political and institutional reforms along western lines. Together, the US and the
EU also presented a joint commitment to liberal democracy that meant that
many newly independent states believed they had no choice but to adopt liberal
democratic constitutions, if they were to have a chance at attracting global trade
and investment.

48

On the way in which various forms of peer pressure, or socialization, can pressure states into
compliance with international law, see, for example, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializng
States: PromotingHuman Rghts through InternationalLaw (Oxford, forthcoming 2010).
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For a discussion of coercion and policy convergence, see Weyland, 57 World Pol at 271-74 (cited
in note 13).
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Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/1/93 Rev 1, European Council in Copenhagen, Gune
1993) ("Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.").
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For pressure of this sort to succeed in creating constitutional change,
however, a dominant state (or group of states) must have both an interest in
changing the behavior of a weak state (or group of states) and the means to
accomplish the change. Dominant states could have an interest in changing the
behavior of weak states for both selfish and altruistic reasons. For example, a
powerful state might seek to introduce a market system in a weak state so as to
have a trading partner; it might also do so from a conviction that the well-being
of people in the weak state will improve as a result. Often motives are mixed. At
least since the Peloponnesian Wars, powerful countries have seen geopolitical
advantages in molding weak countries in their image. The democratic peace
literature gives a gloss of respectability to this impulse. If, as literature suggests, 51
democracies do not fight democracies, then a powerful democracy might try to
force other countries to become democracies so that they no longer pose
military threats to themselves or their allies. This was one of the motives of the
second Iraq War.
In either case, the dominant state's interest must be strong enough to make
worthwhile the expense of coercing the weak state. Almost any method of
coercion can also turn out to be costly for dominant states. Military intervention,
for example, can often turn out to be extremely difficult and risky. The US has
learned (and forgotten) this lesson over and over, from the failed attempt to
protect UN troops in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, to the trillion-plus dollar war
against Iraq. The basic problems are that people in weak states resent and resist
foreign military intervention, even when it has a humanitarian motive; and they
benefit from their knowledge of local terrain and conditions. These factors give
them impressive advantages against which powerful military resources are
helpless.
Attempts to use foreign aid and related benefits, such as trade privileges, to
change foreign states' behavior can also be both costly and limited in their
effectiveness. Policies of this kind can often lead to resentment against the
countries that adopt them, and in some cases, even to retaliatory forms of trade
sanction. Such policies also often fail because of the difficulties in monitoring
how foreign aid is used, which give recipients a strong incentive to use aid for
internal political purposes (or just to pocket it) rather than use it in desired
ways.

52

Whatever method is used, there is yet another problem that limits the
effectiveness of coercive methods for achieving convergence: this is the problem
See, for example, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Prinaiplesfor a Post-Cold War World
(Princeton 1993).
52 See, for example, Dambisa Moyo, DeadAid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way
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of collective action. When multiple countries seek to coerce other countries to
adopt certain constitutional norms, the dominant countries may themselves try
to free ride on each other. Each of the dominant countries prefers that the other
countries incur the expense and risks of coercion. And when the dominant
countries disagree, then the weak countries can play them off against each other.
These problems are especially severe when dominant countries seek to
secure constitutional change, as opposed to mere policy change, in subordinate
countries. If constitutional change, for example, requires a formal amendment to
a country's written constitution, this will often generate far greater public
attention, and also opposition, than more ordinary forms of legal change. If
instead such change is understood to involve entrenchment, it may also be more
strongly resisted than ordinary forms of legal change, because the relevant
undesired outcomes will be permanent (or at least longstanding) rather than
temporary. Even when dominant states can pressure weak states into amending
their constitution, or otherwise entrenching particular legal change, there is also
no guarantee that this will be enough to cause actual change in behavior if
judges, policymakers, and ordinary citizens do not accept the legitimacy of the
relevant change.
A further limitation on coercion as a mechanism for convergence is that it
depends on the country, or group of countries, sharing similar constitutions and
principles. Where major powers have different constitutional norms, either
weaker countries must choose which power to imitate, or, otherwise, the
influence of the two sets of powers is largely self-cancelling. The tendency,
therefore, is toward either constitutional polarization or no change.
During the Cold War era, for example, countries in the Soviet orbit
generally became communist and countries in the American orbit generally
became democracies, in form if not always in fact. In both cases, countries
imitated their patrons in order to avoid isolation and even military coercion, and
to obtain aid, investment, and trade. The result was constitutional polarization
rather than convergence.
In the post-Cold War era, we also see many instances in which, as
countries become less dependent on the West for trade, investment, and foreign
aid, the pressure for convergence toward Western norms is diminished. China,
for example, provides safe haven for commodity-rich countries such as the
Sudan that might otherwise face international isolation from the West. Religious
countries, such as the Vatican (or Holy See) and certain Islamic countries, also
provide an ongoing counterweight to the influence of the US and Western
Europe in certain areas.
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A good example of this involves the conflict between the US and the
Vatican concerning rights of access to abortion during the Clinton
administration.53 In Latin American countries during this period, the influence of
the two sets of countries often led to directly opposing forms of constitutional
change, rather than constitutional convergence. In El Salvador, for example,
most people believe that the Vatican played a decisive role in the 1999
amendment to the constitution adopting protection for fetal life from "the very
moment of conception" and requiring the legislature to pass corresponding
statutory amendments prohibiting abortion in all circumstances. 5 4 In Colombia,
by contrast, the US arguably played an indirect role in helping create
constitutional change in exactly the opposite direction-namely, a decision by
the Constitutional Court of Colombia to strike down an absolute prohibition
against abortion as unconstitutional. 5
In other countries, such as Brazil, the competing influences of the two
countries also meant that there was little net change in the enjoyment of
reproductive rights: while the US spent millions of dollars on family planning
activities, the Vatican publicly called for the excommunication of all doctors
who performed abortions, even those who acted within the bounds of Brazil's
law permitting abortion in cases of rape and threats to a mother's health. 6
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During this period, the US was a powerful international advocate for women's reproductive rights
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D. Competition
The previous section discussed ways in which states respond to pressure
from other states. In this discussion, foreign governments put pressure on other
governments. But states also respond to more indirect forms of pressure
resulting from the choices of individuals-in particular, the choices to migrate
and invest. Some states seek migrants, or certain types of migrants such as
skilled professionals, and also want to avoid the brain drain that takes place
when their own educated citizens migrate to other countries. States also want to
attract investment from foreign citizens, and to deter their own citizens from
investing overseas.
A number of scholars have argued that competition should lead to
constitutional convergence." As before, however, we need to distinguish policy
convergence and constitutional convergence. The first question is whether
competition for investment and migration would lead to policy convergence; the
second question is whether the policy convergence would take constitutional
form.
To see why this distinction is important in the present context, consider
the large body of literature on domestic (that is, within the US) competition
among the states for corporate charters." This literature has focused on policy
convergence, that is, whether states modify their statutory corporate law in order
to attract corporate charters. The literature has not focused on constitutional
convergence (or divergence), that is, whether states modify their constitutions in
order to attract corporate charters.
Scholars have argued that competition for migration should lead to
convergence because people will want to migrate only to places where they have
rights. In the effort to attract such people, nations that do not have rights, or
have only weak rights regimes, will adopt and strengthen rights. For example,
states might adopt the right against self-incrimination, the right to a lawyer, and
the right not to be tortured, because people will be unwilling to migrate to places
where they would have no such rights.
Again, however, there are important potential limits to a mechanism of this
kind when it comes to the likely breadth of constitutional convergence. It is, for
example, not clear that everyone gives such priority to those rights. Migrants
may believe that, however weak their rights in such countries, they do better
because of their high wages. Calculations such as these must explain why the
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countries that attract the most labor migrants-the Persian Gulf countries-do
not have strong rule-of-law protections."
A similar point can be made about investment. Farber, Law, and others
argue that the desire to attract foreign investment will cause countries to adopt
stronger property and due process rights, resulting in convergence."o Foreign
investors will not sink their capital into factories, mines, and other expensive
physical plants if the host country is likely to expropriate their investments. It is
surely true that countries seeking investment will not expropriate every
investment. But the extent of convergence could be very shallow. Investors
might acquiesce in a degree of taxation or limited expropriation as the price of
doing business, especially if this practice ensures general conditions of political
and civil stability, which are necessary for doing business. Many of the most
significant beneficiaries of foreign investment over the last decades-countries
like China, Russia, and many African countries-have extremely weak rule of
law guarantees, while others, such as India, have formal protections that are
frequently ignored in practice because the judicial system is slow and corrupt.
States can also attract migration and investment by carving out legal
enclaves of protection not available to the general public." In some countries,
like Saudi Arabia, foreigners live in segregated compounds where they enjoy
rights that are denied to natives. Other countries, like China, create special
regions where foreign investments are protected from arbitrary expropriation by
local authorities. In these cases, constitutional convergence will at most occur in
only a very narrow, retail sense, and may not even occur at all, because to
maintain enclaves, countries may need to violate norms of equal protection that
are observed in other countries.
In other contexts, the pressure for legal convergence may also be reduced
because people can travel in order to enjoy certain legal rights. A classic example
of this involves the history of "abortion tourism" in European countries such as
the Republic of Ireland, Portugal, and Poland, where women have long traveled
to neighboring countries such as the UK, Spain, Belgium, Germany, and Austria,
and even the Ukraine, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia, in order to obtain access to abortion.62 Not only has constitutional
s9
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tourism of this kind served to diffuse domestic political pressure for change to
abortion laws in these countries, it has also meant that these countries have been
able to remain competitive in their ability to retain female domestic labor, even
in the face of constitutional convergence in the rest of Europe countries toward
a different position.6
A final point about policy convergence is that competition can actually lead
to jurisdictional differences under fairly weak assumptions. Potential migrants
have different tastes and values. 6 4 For example, imagine two types of migrantsone belonging to a large religious group such as Islam, and the other belonging
to a small group like a dissenting Protestant sect. The first migrant might be
attracted to a state where Islam is the established religion, while the other
migrant is more likely to be attracted to a state where religious tolerance is the
norm. Competition for migration thus can lead states to "specialize" in different
types of migration, with the migrants sorting themselves into the different states.
Legal structures would accordingly diverge rather than converge."
Likewise, in some countries, people might prefer certain public goods to
foreign investment, while in other countries people prefer foreign investment.
The first group of countries would not compete for foreign investment, while
the second group of countries would. Venezuela, for example, clearly is willing
to risk the loss of foreign investment so that it can expropriate assets and
redistribute them to the poor. Foreign investors might take their capital to other
countries with less egalitarian policies, but that is a price that Venezuela is willing
to pay.
At a constitutional rather than policy level, there are also additional reasons
why competition for global labor may not lead to convergence. In order to
adopt entrenched forms of constitutional protection for foreign workers or
investors, for example, governments will need, in most cases, to pass some form
of constitutional amendment. By itself, this can create significant constitutional
variation among countries faced with the same competitive pressures, because
constitutional amendment rules vary significantly across countries.
Governments may also decide that it is desirable to maintain legal flexibility
in order to respond to protect migrants and investors. Suppose, for example,
that migrants and investors are threatened by a crime wave, or by a new
insurgency. A strong government that can meet these challenges without
63
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interference by the courts may provide a more attractive place to do business
than a government constantly foiled by its courts. Similarly, if legal protections
for foreign firms turn out to be deeply unpopular domestically, the danger this
creates of political instability may mean that, even for these firms, it is preferable
that certain legal protections be repealed."
Competitive pressures, therefore, need not lead to convergence at either
the policy or constitutional level. Instead, it could lead to divergence and
constitutional sorting.
IV. CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Our main theoretical conclusion is that the pressures toward constitutional
convergence are not as strong as scholars have argued. Learning has limitations
because of differences across states in constitutional and social values, and the
limited information that can be obtained from observing states with different
social and demographic conditions. Coercion has limitations because of the
sheer cost of forcing or bribing other countries to change their behavior, and
problems of coordination among dominant states. Competition can just as easily
lead to sorting, and hence divergence, as to increasing similarity.
Probably the best case for constitutional convergence comes from the
superstructure approach. To the extent that countries have become more similar
in their polices and values because of increasing interaction, it would not be
surprising if their constitutions became similar as well. But it is not clear that
countries are becoming more similar, or, if they are, whether these increasing
similarities are temporary or permanent.
What of the evidence that seems to support the convergence thesis,
including the waves of democratization, the growth of rights cultures across
countries, and the rise of independent judiciaries? It is easy to find spurious
patterns in anecdotal evidence, and, as we noted above, rigorous empirical work
has so far not found any evidence of constitutional convergence." In addition,
research on policy (as opposed to constitutional) convergence suggests that
policy diffusion follows the pattern of an S-shaped curve. One country moves
67
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first; a few countries slowly imitate it; then the number of imitators rapidly
increases; and then the curve flattens out. Significantly, the flattening out can
occur well before all or even most countries have adopted the policy initiated by
the first country. 9 If policy diffusion does not always lead to convergence, then
certainly constitutional diffusion will not necessarily lead to constitutional
convergence, given the greater difficulty in effecting constitutional change.
Debates over the extent of constitutional convergence and comparison are
also closely linked-and not just in a temporal sense."
To be useful, constitutional comparison requires that global constitutional
practices provide some additional information to domestic decision-makers
about either the workability or desirability of particular constitutional choices.
The more constitutional convergence occurs as a result of the superstructure
idea, coercion, or competition, the less likely it is that global practices will, in
fact, provide information of this sort.
If global constitutional practices are simply the product of the global
superstructure, for example, the existence of those practices will provide no
useful information to domestic decision-makers about what other similarly
situated constitutional decision-makers regard as either morally or pragmatically
desirable. Foreign decision-makers themselves are helpless, or at the mercy of
events. The constitutional practices they adopt will therefore only be as good, or
bad, as the underlying factors that influence them.
If foreign constitutional practices are the result of coercion, there will again
be little useful information to be gained by identifying the existence of those
practices. While there may be reasons to justify international coercion in some
cases, in general, we think that coercion raises potentially troubling normative
issues. Where compliance reflects coercion rather than consent, the mere fact
that some countries comply with particular international norms says nothing at
71
all about the moral desirability or correctness of those norms.
Even where constitutional changes occur as a result of competition, rather
than exogenous changes in conditions or coercion, there will also be limits to the
information this can provide domestic decision-makers about the right answer to
hard constitutional questions: from the perspective of countries that are large
exporters of capital and labor, changes of this kind will often simply reflect the
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See, for example, Weyland, 57 World Pol at 267 (cited in note 11).
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For the temporal linkage, see note 1.
Compare Posner and Sunstein, 59 Stan L Rev 131 (cited in note 46), with Jeremy Waldron,
Comment, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 Harv L Rev 129 (2005) (discussing the
conditions necessary for meaningful deliberation among countries about the morality of various
practices).
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export of existing domestic constitutional preferences, rather than new
information about foreign constitutional preferences.
If constitutional convergence based on these mechanisms is in fact as
broad and inevitable as some suggest, therefore, constitutional decision-makers
should have much greater pause than currently as to the scope of useful forms
of constitutional comparison-at least by them, rather than scholars.
The more such mechanisms apply, the less likely it is, in any given context,
that even an apparent global "consensus" on a particular constitutional question
will actually provide useful information about constitutional morality or
consequences.72 For constitutional outsiders, it will also often be extremely
difficult to determine the precise role played by such mechanisms, relative to
more independent forms of constitutional judgment in foreign countries.
Only if constitutional convergence is in fact limited and contingent, in the
way we suggest, can domestic decision-makers be truly confident that,
probabilistically, there will be useful information to be gained from the fact of
consistent global constitutional practices in a particular area, and, therefore, that
there is room for meaningful forms of comparative learning and borrowing.
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But see, for example, Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 576 (noting that "every country in the world . .
. save for the United States and Somalia" had ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which "contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by
juveniles under 18").
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